Under what conditions does a physical system implement or realize a computation?
3 abstract state-transition relation are mapped onto physical state-types related by a corresponding causal state-transition function.
Chalmers later offers an emended version of structuralism, but the emendations do not matter for us. I want to address the intuitive idea behind structuralism, not the specifics of how Chalmers or anyone else develops it. Chalmers ([1995] , p. 401) formulates the intuitive idea as follows:
To implement a computation is just to have a set of components that interact causally according to a certain pattern. The nature of the components does not matter, and nor does the way that the causal links between components are implemented; all that matters is the pattern of causal organization of the system.
On this view, a physical system implements a computation if it instantiates some relevant "pattern of causal organization." The computation imposes no constraints on physical systems that implement it, save that they exhibit the desired pattern. What matters is the pattern, viewed as an "isomorphism type." Of course, a physical system"s states have many properties, such as shapes and colors, that outstrip any causal pattern dictated by the computation. According to structuralism, such properties do not inform whether the system implements the computation.
What matters are the causal patterns, not the particular states composing the patterns.
I will argue that structuralism predicts incorrect implementation conditions for some, though perhaps not all, computations. I concede that an appropriate pattern of causal organization is necessary for implementing a computation. I deny that it is sufficient. My argument hinges upon the relation between computation and representation. Intuitively, a physical system represents some subject matter just in case its states are about that subject matter. Following standard philosophical usage, I say that such a system has semantic properties.
I will argue that certain computational models individuate computational states through their 4 semantic properties. A physical system implements such a model only if it has appropriate semantic properties. These "appropriate semantic properties" do not supervene upon any relevant pattern of causal organization. Thus, instantiating the specified pattern of causal organization does not suffice to implement the model. §2 reviews some relevant philosophical literature. § §3-5 present my basic antistructuralist argument. §6 extends the argument to a weakened variant of structuralism. §7 addresses Putnam-Searle trivial arguments. §8 connects my discussion with Burge"s anti- individualism about mental content.
Semantics and computational implementation
Some philosophers hold that a physical system implements a computation only if the system has representational properties (Crane [1990] ; Fodor [1998] , p. 10; Ladyman [2009b] ; Sprevak [2010] ). In Ladyman"s words, "for physical states to count as computational states they must be genuinely representational" ([2009b] , p. 382). Similarly, Sprevak ([2010] , p. 260) claims that "appeal to representational content is inescapable when attributing computations to physical systems." Call this the semantic view of computational implementation. On the semantic view, all physical computational systems have semantic or representational properties.
At the opposite extreme, philosophers such as Chalmers ([1995] ), Egan ([1992] ), and Piccinini ([2008] ) deny that semantics ever informs computational implementation. Call this the non-semantic view of computational implementation. As Chalmers ([1995] , p. 399) puts it, "when computer designers ensure that their machines implement the programs that they are supposed to, they do this by ensuring that the mechanisms have the right causal organization; they are not concerned with semantic content." Proponents of the non-semantic view can acknowledge that 5 certain computational systems have semantic properties. They merely deny that we should cite semantics or representation when specifying what it is for a physical system to implement a given computation.
I reject both the semantic and the non-semantic views of computational implementation.
Many computational models are implementable by physical systems that lack representational properties. But other computational models have implementation conditions that essentially involve representation. My position steers a middle course between two extreme views: that implementation conditions always involve semantics, and that implementation conditions never involve semantics. On my position, the implementation conditions for some but not all computational models essentially involve semantic properties.
As a potential counter-example to the semantic view, consider a simple finite state vending machine discussed by Godfrey-Smith ([2009] ). The machine has two inputs (I 1 = 5 cents, I 2 = 10 cent), three outputs (O 1 = null, O 2 = Coke, O 3 = Coke & 5 cents), and three internal states S 1 , S 2 , and S 3 , governed by the following transition table:
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE Call this machine "VEND." The implementation condition for VEND does not seem to involve meaning, representational content, or "aboutness." A physical system can implement VEND even if its states lack any semantic interpretation. Of course, one might impose representational talk upon the system. For instance, one might say that a system entering into state S 2 thereby "represents" that 5 cents more are required for a Coke. At best, such representational attributions reflect a Dennettian "stance" towards the system (Dennett [1987] ), not a genuine constraint the 6 system must satisfy to implement VEND. Nothing about VEND itself seems to require that we attribute representational import to states S 1 , S 2 , and S 3 . Nothing about VEND"s transition table assigns any essential role to semantics, representation, or content.
In what follows, I focus on presenting counter-examples to the non-semantic view. I will highlight the implementation conditions attributed by computer scientists to specific computations, and I will argue that those implementation conditions feature semantic properties in an essential way. Furthermore, I will argue that the relevant semantic properties outstrip any pattern of causal organization specified by the computation. Thus, the counter-examples are also counter-examples to structuralism. My heavy emphasis upon contemporary CS is a distinctive feature of my methodology. No previous discussion so thoroughly highlights how structuralism conflicts with entrenched CS practice.
Conforming to instructions
Computational implementation is grounded in a more general notion: conforming to instructions.
Many activities are governed by instructions: following a recipe, performing a musical composition, and so on. Conforming to instructions requires doing what the instructions say. For instance, if a recipe instructs me to add salt, then conforming to the recipe requires that I add salt.
2 Computation falls under special instructions that are "mechanical," "effective," or "algorithmic." As Knuth ([1968] , p. 6) emphasizes, the instructions are precise and mindless, in contrast with the instructions found in recipes ("sauté until the chicken is nicely browned" 
E3.
[Interchange] Set m  n, n  r, and go back to step E1.
where ""m  n" means the value of variable m is to be replaced by the current value of variable n." To execute the Euclidean algorithm, I must conform to instructions E1-E3 in the proper order.
How do I conform to the instruction "divide m by n"? I must represent n and m, either in my thought or else through a symbolic representation, such as pencil marks on the page. I then perform the arithmetical operation of division upon those numbers. Thus, executing the Euclidean algorithm requires representing numbers and performing arithmetical operations on those numbers. Conforming to the algorithm"s component instructions requires bearing appropriate semantic relations to the natural numbers.
Following Peacocke ([1994] ), I say that an instruction is content-involving just in case it individuates states partly through their representational properties. A content-involving instruction is specified, at least partly, in semantic or representational terms. On this usage, the instructions that compose the Euclidean algorithm are content-involving. The instructions taxonomize computational states through representational relations to natural numbers.
In what follows, I will extend the foregoing analysis to the rigorous computational formalisms employed by computer scientists. A good theory of computational implementation should address both programming languages (such as C++, LISP, or Prolog) and machine models (such as the Turing machine or the register machine). I will discuss programming languages in §4 and machine models in §5. In both cases, I will offer content-involving counterexamples to structuralism. In this spirit, consider how a leading CS textbook renders the Euclidean algorithm within Scheme, a dialect of LISP (Abelson and Sussman [1996] , p. 49):
where "remainder" is taken as primitive. The issue here is not whether semantic properties such as representing the number m are "non-structural" in some metaphysically absolute sense. Perhaps semantic properties ultimately reduce to some physical system"s "causal structure isomorphism type." For instance, the causal organization of the surrounding human linguistic community may suffice to confer determinate semantic properties on M 10 "s computational states. My point is that representational properties do not reduce to any causal pattern specified by the Scheme program. The program"s formal structure does not even begin to fix a unique semantic interpretation. Implementing the program requires more than instantiating a causal structure that mirrors relevant formal structure.
Some readers may worry that the keyboard for M 13 should have three extra keys, to serve as extra primitive digits for base-13 notation. In that case, M 10 and M 13 would not be intrinsic physical duplicates. However, we can avoid this worry in various ways. We might stipulate that M 13 does not have three extra keys, perhaps due to a mishap at the factory, or the whims of an eccentric inventor. In such a scenario, M 13 does not represent all the natural numbers, so members of the surrounding linguistic community will not find it useful for arithmetical calculation. Nevertheless, it executes the same syntactic manipulations as M 10 . Alternatively, we might stipulate that M 10 is built with three functionally redundant extra digits on the keyboard.
Finally, we might change the example by comparing base-10 not with base-13 but with some alternative mapping from Arabic numerals to numbers, which would again ensure that the doppelganger machine does not execute our Scheme program. 4 Given the foregoing options, we may safely ignore any worries about missing extra keys on M 13 "s keyboard.
I have developed my argument with respect to a single counter-example. However, we could extend the argument to numerous other programs formulated in Scheme or another programming language. CS features content-involving programs for computing square roots, factorials, prime factorizations, and so on (Abelson and Sussman [1996] , pp. 31-90, pp. 384-385). We could apply the above argumentative strategy to any such program.
But how can executing a computer program require having certain representational properties, when the program itself is just a meaningless string of signs? Aren"t M 10 and M 13 programmed with the same Scheme instructions? How can there be any significant difference between the computations executed by M 10 and M 13 ?
I respond that there is more to a program than meaningless signs. The signs have an intended interpretation as instructions to do something, just as a recipe has an intended interpretation as instructions to do something. The intended meaning of "add salt" is that one should add salt. The intended meaning of our Scheme program is that the machine should perform certain arithmetical operations. M 10 and M 13 are programmed with the same strings, but those strings contain numerals that have different meanings within the respective linguistic practices in which M 10 and M 13 are embedded, so the strings have different intended meanings.
Despite syntactic overlap, M 10 and M 13 do not execute the same instructions. To claim otherwise suggests a use-mention confusion between the numerals composing a programming language and the numbers denoted by those numerals (as used by the surrounding linguistic community).
Chalmers might dismiss content-involving descriptions of computer programs as heuristic remarks that serve a useful pedagogical function without being literally true. Isn"t talk about numbers and arithmetical operations just a loose way of describing syntactic manipulation of numerals? Wouldn"t a more rigorous description eschew semantic locutions?
I will now argue that this suggestion flouts entrenched CS practice, which assigns a crucial, non-heuristic status to content-involving instructions.
The denotational semantics of Scheme
Programming languages are artificial constructs. In contrast with natural languages, their meanings reflect explicit stipulation rather than tacit convention. For instance, the Revised n Report on the Algorithmic Language Scheme (RnRS) standardizes the syntax and semantics of Scheme. The latest revision is R6RS (Sperber, et al. [2009] ), although R5RS (Kelsey, et al.
[1998]) still enjoys wide popularity. RnRS stipulates the official meanings of Scheme programs, so it provides unrivaled insight into those meanings.
RnRS straightforwardly endorses a content-involving construal of Scheme instructions. It explicitly distinguishes numerals from numbers. It emphasizes that implementation of Scheme programs requires representing numbers and performing arithmetical operations. For instance, R6RS includes the following key passage: "it is important to distinguish between the mathematical numbers [and] the Scheme objects that attempt to model them… In this report, the term number refers to a mathematical number, and the term number object refers to a Scheme object representing a number" (p. 24). The report enumerates various arithmetical operations executed by Scheme (pp. 81-96), such as "number-theoretic integer division" and "the greatest common divisor" (p. 92), and it explicitly distinguishes those arithmetical operations from mere syntactic manipulation of numerals ("number objects").
That Scheme"s designers intend their talk about numerical representation literally is confirmed by the official formal semantics offered in R5RS. The formal semantics codifies talk about numerical representation through a rigorous denotational semantics, based on work of 14 Scott ([1972] ) and Strachey ([1966] illustrates with a simple language of binary terms and arithmetical function signs:
where E[ [ … ] ] maps an expression to its denotation. Expanding this approach to a full programming language is complex task that requires serious mathematical machinery (Stoy [1977] ). For the specifics regarding Scheme, see (Kelsey, et al. [1998] , pp. 84-95).
The key point for us is already implicit in Mitchell"s toy example: just as the name suggests, "denotational semantics" codifies representational relations to extra-syntactic entities such as numbers. As Mitchell ([2003] , p. 70) describes his example:
[o]n the right-hand side of the equal signs, numbers and arithmetical operations *, +, and -are meant to indicate the actual natural numbers and the standard integer operations of multiplication, addition, and subtraction. In contrast, the symbols + and -and expressions surrounded by double square brackets on the left-hand side of the equal signs are symbols of the object language, the language of binary expressions.
Obviously, Mitchell recognizes the distinction between numerals and numbers, and he holds that denotational semantics assigns numbers as denotations to numerals. Similar remarks, with similar attention to use-mention distinctions, appear frequently in the denotational semantics literature (Allison [1986] , pp. 4-5; Stoy [1977] , pp. 26-31). That literature provides the background for Scheme"s official denotational semantics. The semantics takes numerals to represent numbers, and it takes certain computational states to involve assignment of numbers to memory locations (Kelsey, et al. [1998] , pp. 84-95).
In summary, Scheme"s designers explicitly stipulate that executing certain Scheme programs requires instantiating suitable semantic properties. They present this stipulation both through informal remarks and through a formal denotational semantics. There can be no we do not merely dismiss a few extraneous asides. We dismiss entrenched features of scientific practice. We must argue that computer scientists are pervasively mistaken about the meanings of instructions formulated in a programming language that they themselves invented. We must hold that CS as currently practiced is radically mistaken, requiring systematic correction by philosophers. We must apply an extreme error theory to the CS community.
Are there compelling grounds for embracing this radically revisionist agenda? I will now consider and reject two possible grounds.
Worries about intentionality
Beginning with Quine ([1960] ), many philosophers have insisted that representationality, or intentionality, is suspect. Quine argued that intentionality cannot be reduced to the nonintentional. He concluded that intentional locutions deserve no place in scientific discourse.
Deploying Quinean worries about intentionality, one might argue that semantics deserves no place in our theory of computational implementation. Chalmers argues along these lines, although he does not explicitly mention Quine. He warns that "[i]f we build semantic considerations into the conditions for implementation, any role that computation can play in providing a foundation for AI and cognitive science will be endangered, as the notion of semantic content is so ill-understood that it desperately needs a foundation itself" ([1995] , p. 399). He does not say what it is for computation to provide a "foundation" for AI and cognitive
science, or what it would be to provide a "foundation" for the notion of semantic content. But the idea seems to be that intentional notions are so obscure that science should cite them only once we have reduced them to non-intentional notions.
I disagree. I will not review the well-known Quinean and Quine-inspired arguments that intentionality is legitimate only if reducible to the non-intentional. However, I agree with Burge ([2010] , pp. 296-298) that those arguments are uniformly unconvincing. There is no principled reason why a science that employs primitive intentional notions counts as irredeemably flawed.
There is no clear reason why scientific appeals to intentionality must await the completion of some reductive philosophical enterprise. I do not dismiss the problem of intentionality as a pseudo-question. There is a genuine puzzle about what confers content on linguistic expressions or mental states. We should try to solve that puzzle. But why must we solve it in order for semantics to occupy a legitimate role within current science? There is no clear reason why scientists who cite semantic properties must explain the facts by virtue of which an entity has semantic properties, any more than economists who cite monetary value must elucidate the facts by virtue of which an entity has monetary value. For many purposes, we can hypothesize that an entity has certain semantic properties (just as economists hypothesize that an entity has certain monetary properties), deploying that hypothesis within our theorizing.
In effect, Quine and Chalmers impose an "external" norm of clarity upon scientific practice. They allow science to cite intentionality only once intentionality meets proprietary philosophical standards of perspicuity, standards that find no grounding in current science itself.
This methodology has a disreputable history. For instance, the same methodology guided those who argued that Newtonian gravity was occult because it violated their mechanistic world view.
My paper employs an opposing methodology. I scrutinize the current science of physical computation (specifically, CS), and I ask what standards of clarity and success that science embodies. The standards derive from scientific practice, not from some external standpoint.
Given this methodology, we should not dismiss intentionality as obscure or illicit. Computer scientists routinely individuate machine states by their semantic properties (e.g. representing the number n). We therefore have prima facie reason to accept semantic properties as scientifically legitimate. The attacks on intentionality launched by Quine and his followers do not even begin to defeat this prima facie reason.
Worries about the natural numbers
Another possible rationale for revising CS emphasizes not representation in general, but representation of the natural numbers specifically. One might worry that numbers do not exist, or that my analysis presupposes an overly Platonist conception of them. One might also worry about the ability of a human or machine to represent the numbers, given that we cannot causally interact with abstract entities (Benacerraf [1973] ). Citing such worries, Turner ([2007]) maintains that denotational semantics is far more problematic than operational semantics. More generally, one might argue that numerical representation deserves no place in implementation conditions for computer programs, despite whatever computer scientists may say.
A key point to recall here is that classical mathematics features widespread apparent ontological commitment to abstract entities, including the natural numbers. Thus, it is no devastating objection to contemporary CS that it likewise features such ontological commitment.
On the contrary, the burden lies with nominalists to explain away or otherwise accommodate ubiquitous talk about abstract entities within classical mathematics. Whatever maneuvers nominalists deploy towards that end can presumably be extended towards talk about abstract entities within CS. The widespread CS commitment to content-involving instructions raises no special ontological problems beyond those raised by classical mathematics more generally.
I do not want to downplay the vexing questions raised by mathematical representation.
There are important problems concerning the ontological status of the natural numbers, not to mention our representational access to them. I claim only that my argument in this paper is compatible with any remotely plausible solution to these problems.
On any plausible view, there is an important difference between base-10 and base-13 notation. Mathematical activity is not simply a game during which we manipulate a meaningless formal calculus. Mathematical symbols are meaningful. To capture the meanings of 20 mathematical symbols, Platonists cite denotational relations to mind-independent abstract entities. Anti-Platonists reject this approach. But any plausible view, including even a nominalist view, must acknowledge that the numeral "20" has a different meaning in base-10 notation than base-13 notation. This difference in meaning is all that my argument requires. 6 To rephrase my argument:
(1) It is possible for there to exist intrinsic physical duplicates M 10 and M 13 , the former appropriately embedded in a linguistic community that employs base-10 notation, the latter embedded in a linguistic community that employs base-13 notation. Since M 10 and M 13 are intrinsic physical duplicates, they have the same causal organization.
(2) M 10 manipulates numerals whose meanings are given by base-10 notation, and it executes appropriate syntactic manipulations, so it thereby implements the Euclidean algorithm Scheme program. M 13 manipulates numerals whose meanings are given by base-13, so it does not implement the Euclidean algorithm Scheme program, even though it executes the same syntactic manipulations as M 10 .
Taken together, (1) and (2) Needless to say, one can easily encode the above program through an explicit transition function.
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We can now consider register machine analogues to M 10 and M 13 . The only wrinkle is that the register machine formalism explicitly assumes infinite discrete memory capacity. Infinite discrete memory capacity is impossible in practice and perhaps in principle. So it is doubtful that a physical system can literally implement a register machine. I avoid this wrinkle by considering a modified formalism that assumes large but finite memory capacity in each register. (To a first approximation, modern computers are physical realizations of such a formalism.) Let us henceforth consider a Euclidean algorithm "register machine" subject to these finitary memory restrictions. Then we can implement the machine with an actual physical computer R 10 .
Imagine a system R 13 with the same local, intrinsic physical properties as R 10 , but employed by a society that uses base-13 rather than base-10 notation. Then R 10 implements the Euclidean algorithm register machine, but R 13 does not. The two systems instantiate the same "causal structure isomorphism type," but only one of them implements the Euclidean algorithm register machine. The difference, as with M 10 and M 13 , reflects the linguistic environments in which the machines are respectively embedded. Once again, this particular counter-example is representative of an infinite class of counter-examples, since we can describe infinitely many register machines that perform arithmetical operations over numbers. I conclude that implementing a machine model sometimes requires instantiating suitable semantic properties, which do not reduce to any relevant pattern of causal organization.
8
Talk about register machines performing arithmetical operations is no mere pedagogical crutch. It figures prominently in the original paper that introduced register machines (Shepherdson and Sturgis [1961] ). That paper"s first register machine contains infinitely many registers, "each of which can store any natural numbers 0, 1, 2, …" (p. 219). The machine"s basic instructions include "add 1 to the number in register n," "subtract 1 from the number in register n," and "place 0 in register n" (p. 219). Lest one dismiss such talk as careless or confused allusions to syntactic operations on numerals, Shepherdson and Sturgis later distinguish numerals from numbers (p. 226), offering a new definition of register machines defined over formal languages. Such passages are not decisive, but they further demonstrate that structuralism is revisionary regarding the aims and methods of CS. To embrace CS as it currently stands, we must reject structuralism as a general theory of computational implementation.
Objection:
The Euclidean algorithm register machine takes the remainder operation as primitive. That operation has computational structure, since it involves iterated application of multiplication and subtraction. You have biased your case against structuralism by choosing an example with "hidden" computational structure.
Reply: We can easily modify the example so as to reveal the hidden computational structure. We can employ a modified Euclidean algorithm register machine that features only the primitive arithmetical operations posited by Shepherdson and Sturgis: add 1, subtract 1, and replace with 0. Those primitive operations do not hide computational structure. Shifting towards this more elementary register machine does not alter our basic moral. We can still construct intrinsic physical duplicates S 10 and S 13 embedded in contrasting linguistic environments, with S 10 executing the register machine and S 13 not. We need merely stipulate that the respective linguistic communities associate appropriately different semantic interpretations with S 10 and S 13 .
For instance, if S 10 performs a syntactic manipulation that replaces numeral "9" with numeral "10", then S 10 conforms to the instruction add 1. In contrast, when S 13 performs that same syntactic manipulation, it instead conforms to the instruction add 4 (since "10" denotes 13 in base-13 notation). Thus, decomposing our register machine into "unstructured" computational steps does not weaken our anti-structuralist conclusion.
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Objection: Structuralists intend their account to apply only to computational models specified in non-representational terms. You define "computational model" more broadly to include semantic interpretation as part of the model, so that semantic constraints naturally become relevant to implementation. The difference is a purely terminological one regarding what counts as a "genuine computational model."
Reply: This objection trivializes structuralism by dismissing all putative counterexamples as "non-genuine" computational models. Nothing in contemporary CS suggests that models such as the Euclidean algorithm register machine are second-class or otherwise undeserving of the label "computational." On the contrary, to reject content-involving instructions is to reject large swathes of entrenched scientific practice. For instance, the inventors of the world"s first stored-program electronic digital computer, the Manchester "Baby," explicitly described it as performing arithmetical operations on numbers, including division and factorization (Williams and Kilburn [1948] ). Structuralists will dismiss this description as a confused allusion to underlying syntactic operations. Yet they offer no convincing grounds for the dismissal. The burden of proof lies with structuralists to defend their revisionary stance towards CS. Thus far, they have not even begun to meet that burden.
Bounded structuralism
Philosophers have proposed several variants of structuralism. For instance, Copeland ([1996]) and Godfrey-Smith ([2009] ) suggest that the isomorphism between formal models and physical systems must map formal states to physical state types that are "natural" rather than "gerrymandered." I will not canvass such variants. In virtually all cases, it is straightforward to show that the variant encounters essentially the same counter-examples presented in § §3-5.
However, I want to address one notable variant, which I call bounded structuralism.
9
According to bounded structuralism, a physical system realizes a computation just in case: (i) the system instantiates an appropriate pattern of causal organization; (ii) the system has inputs and outputs with desired properties. Implementing a computation requires not only instantiating a causal structure isomorphic with the computation"s formal structure but also satisfying certain "boundary conditions." To motivate bounded structuralism over structuralism simpliciter, Chrisley ([1994] ), Godfrey-Smith ([2009] ), and Putnam ([1989] , p. 124) note that computational description of a physical system usually cites inherent, non-functional properties of inputs and outputs: e.g. configurations of a computer"s keyboard, mouse, or screen, or of a robot"s sensors or motor organs.
Bounded structuralists can concede that semantics informs computational implementation "at the periphery," i.e. by constraining input-output states. For instance, they can say that implementing the Euclidean algorithm register machine requires: (i) instantiating an appropriate pattern of causal organization; (ii) having inputs and outputs whose semantic interpretation is given by base-10 (rather than, say, base-13). Since R 13 does not satisfy clause (ii), bounded structuralists can say that R 13 does not implement the Euclidean algorithm register machine. In this manner, bounded structuralism avoids the particular counter-examples canvassed above.
Nevertheless, I will argue that bounded structuralism encounters modified counter-examples.
Say that semantic interpretation of a physical computer"s states is homogenous just in case it assigns the same meaning to a syntactic item throughout the entire course of computation.
If semantic interpretation is homogenous, then we fix the meanings of internal states by fixing the meanings of input or output states (assuming that all syntactic items figuring in internal states also figure as possible inputs or outputs). Yet why must semantic interpretation be homogenous?
Homogenous interpretation may be more convenient or natural. It may cohere better with our goals and practices. But there is no principled bar to non-homogenous interpretation. A community might impose the following convention: numerals figuring in a machine"s inputoutput states fall under a base-10 interpretation, but numerals figuring in the machine"s internal states fall under a base-13 interpretation. The convention may strike us as deviant, but that does not prevent it from successfully conferring determinate contents on machine states.
Suppose now that an intrinsic physical duplicate of R 10 is embedded in a community that employs the proposed non-homogenous semantics. Call the duplicate "R 10/13 ." Does R 10/13 implement our Euclidean algorithm register machine? Implementing the machine requires conforming to its instructions, which include content-involving descriptions of the machine"s internal calculations. For instance, if we provide the register machine with inputs 115 and 20, then its program dictates that it should compute the remainder of 20 divided into 115. This is a purely "internal calculation" that does not directly manifest as an output. R 10 conforms to the instruction by assigning numeral "15" to register t. By virtue of making that assignment, and by virtue of falling under an appropriate semantic interpretation, R 10 computes the remainder of 20 into 115. R 10/13 will also assign "15" to register t, but in doing so it does not compute the remainder of 20 divided into 115. Given the interpretation associated with R 10/13 , "15" denotes 18
when it figures in internal states (such as the assignment of "15" to register t). Thus, R 10/13 does not conform to the requisite content-involving instruction (compute the remainder of 20 divided into 115). So R 10/13 does not implement the desired register machine. Yet its causal structure is isomorphic to the register machine"s formal structure, and its inputs and outputs have appropriate meanings. Hence, R 10/13 is a counter-example to bounded structuralism. Given the possibility of non-homogenous semantic interpretations, (*) undermines bounded structuralism just as readily as it undermines structuralism simpliciter. One might argue that current practice is mistaken in embracing (*). But such radical revisionism requires extensive defense, which structuralists have not even begun to provide.
Non-homogenous semantic interpretations will strike some readers as intuitively deviant, unnatural, or contrived. For that reason, R 10/13 exerts less intuitive force against bounded structuralism than R 13 exerts against structuralism simpliciter. But there are two reasons to ignore the intuitive diminution in force. First, CS frequently employs non-homogeneous semantic interpretations. In decision algorithms, for example, it is common to interpret inputs "|" and "||" as meaning 0 and 1 when they figure as inputs but as meaning "yes" or "no" when they figure as outputs. Second, and more importantly, intuitive "unnaturalness" is irrelevant to our discussion.
R 10/13 , however bizarre, is surely possible. So the only question is whether it constitutes a counter-example to bounded structuralism. I claim that it does. That it seems contrived or deviant does not render it any less a counter-example.
Triviality arguments
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Philosophers sometimes claim that the implementation relation is trivial. Most dramatically, Searle ([1990] ) argues that every physical system implements every computation. Putnam ([1988] , pp. 121-125) defends a somewhat weaker triviality thesis. Triviality arguments typically assume the structuralist view that computational implementation requires only an "isomorphic mapping" between the computation"s formal structure and the physical system"s causal structure (perhaps constrained by input/output restrictions). We can erect a gerrymandered isomorphism between a computation and numerous inappropriate systems. As Searle ([1990] , p. 27) puts it, "the wall behind my back is right now implementing the Wordstar program, because there is some pattern of molecule movements that is isomorphic with the formal structure of Wordstar."
Many structuralists try to the block the inference from structuralism to pancomputationalism. For instance, Copeland ([1996] ) and Godfrey-Smith ([2009] namely, those models that individuate computational states in content-involving terms.
Searle might retort that I have played into his hands by emphasizing representation. We can change R 13 "s representational properties simply by altering the surrounding linguistic environment. Doesn"t it follow that R 13 "s semantic properties are indeterminate, subjective, trivial, or otherwise suspect? Doesn"t my analysis entail that the implementation relation itself is indeterminate, subjective, trivial, or otherwise suspect?
The proposed retort shows that we can change semantic properties. It does not even begin to show that there is anything suspect about semantic properties. For instance, the word "dog" currently denotes dogs. We could change our linguistic practice to change the word"s meaning.
Until we do so, "dog" has a stable, determinate meaning. Similarly, there is a stable, determinate contrast between R 10 and R 13 . R 10 manipulates numerals whose meanings are given by base-10, while R 13 manipulates numerals whose meanings are given by base-13. There is nothing indeterminate, subjective, trivial, or otherwise suspect about this semantic difference. The linguistic practices in which R 10 and R 13 are currently embedded engender a determinate semantic difference between the two physical systems. We could eradicate this difference by embedding R 13 in a different linguistic practice, such as the practice in which R 10 is currently embedded.
Until we do so, R 13 "s states fall under the stable, determinate semantic interpretation given by base-13. Until we do so, R 13 does not implement the Euclidean algorithm register machine.
Searle may object that a single linguistic practice can fail to determine a unique semantic interpretation. A society might simultaneously employ conflicting interpretations of a physical computer"s states. For instance, a society might employ binary strings to represent numbers on some occasions and to represent graphs on other occasions. Thus, semantic interpretation might be underdetermined even within a single linguistic practice.
This latest objection does not purport to establish the pernicious triviality advanced by Searle"s original argument. The objection provides no hint that R 13 , let alone a wall, implements the Euclidean algorithm register machine. At best, the objection establishes a kind of underdetermination: facts about a system"s physical properties and the surrounding computational practice may not fully determine whether the system implements a computation.
I agree that this kind of underdetermination can arise. I also claim that it is harmless. By analogy, the phonological item "bank" can mean either financial institution or river bank.
Linguistic practice does not itself fully determine the meaning of a given utterance featuring that phonological item. Nevertheless, in any ordinary context of use, speaker intentions and expectations fix a unique, determinate meaning. Similarly, suppose that states of physical system P are subject to two distinct interpretations within a society: the states can denote numbers, or they can denote graphs. In most normal contexts, a human user will intend only one of these interpretations. If the user wants to compute a number-theoretic function, she will intend the first interpretation. If she wants to compute a function over graphs, she will intend the second. Her intentions fix determinate semantic properties for P"s states during that particular context of use.
During any such context, there is a determinate fact about which computations P implements.
There may be certain unusual contexts in which P"s semantic and computational properties are and it must embrace anti-individualism about computational implementation. Only by satisfying these constraints can we securely ground the philosophical analysis of computational implementation in contemporary scientific practice.
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